by Victor Davis Hanson<\/p>\n
National Review Online<\/em><\/p>\n I<\/span>f I could sum up the new orthodoxy about Iraq, it might run something like the following:\u00a0\u201cI supported the overthrow of the odious Saddam Hussein. But then the poor postwar planning, the unanticipated sectarian strife and insurrection, the mounting American losses, the failure to find weapons of mass destruction \u2014 all that and more lost my support. Iraq may or may not work out, but I can see now it clearly wasn\u2019t worth the American effort.\u201d<\/i><\/p>\n Aside from the old rehash over disbanding the Iraqi army or tardiness in forming a government, three observations can be made about this \u201creadjustment\u201d in belief. First, the nature of the lapses after March 2003 is still the subject of legitimate debate; second, our mistakes are no more severe than in most prior wars; and third, they are not fatal to our cause.<\/p>\n Consider the most frequently alleged errors: the need for more troops; the need to have restored immediate order; and the need to have had up-armored vehicles and some tactical counterplan to improvised explosive devices.<\/p>\n In none of these cases, was the manner of the solution all that clear-cut \u2014 especially since on the first day of the war the United States was trying to avoid targeting civilians, avoiding infrastructure as much as possible, and waging a supposed war of liberation rather than one of punitive annihilation.<\/p>\n Had we brought in another 200,000 troops to secure Iraq, the vast increases in the size and cost of American support might not have been commensurate within an increased ability to put down the insurrection, which from the beginning was decentralized and deliberately designed to play off larger concentrations of conventional patrolling Americans \u2014 the more targets the better.<\/p>\n The insurrection broke out not so much because we had 200,000 rather than 400,000 troops in country; but rather because a three-week strike that decapitated the Baathist elite, despite its showy \u201cshock and awe\u201d pyrotechnics, was never intended, World War II-like, to crush the enemy and force terms on a shell-shocked, defeated, and humiliated populace. Many of our challenges, then, are not the war in Iraq per se, but the entire paradox of postmodern war in general in a globally televised world.<\/p>\n And if the point of Iraq was to stress \u201cIraqification\u201d and avoid too large an American footprint in the Middle East, then ubiquitous Americans may have posed as many problems as they solved \u2014 with two or three Green zones rather than one. Instead of drawing down to 100,000 we might now be talking of hoping to keep below 300,000 troops.<\/p>\n Past history suggests that military efficacy is not so much always a question of the number of troops \u2014 but rather of how they are used. Especially large American deployments can foster dependency rather than autonomy on the part of the Iraqi security forces. Each month, fewer Americans are dying in Iraq, while more Iraqis are fighting the terrorists \u2014 as it becomes clear to them that some enormous occupation force is not on its own going to save the Iraqis\u2019 democracy for them.<\/p>\n The looting should have been stopped. But by the same token, after the statue fell, had the U.S. military begun immediately to shoot looters on sight \u2014 and that was what restoring order would have required \u2014 or carpet bombed the Syrian and Iranian borders to stop infiltration, the outcry would have arisen that we were too punitive and gunning down poor and hungry people even in peace. I fear that 400,000 peacekeepers, given the rules of postbellum engagement, would have been no more likely to shoot thieves than would 200,000.<\/p>\n We forget that one of the reasons for the speed of the American advance and then the sudden rush to stop military operations \u2014 as was true in the first Gulf War \u2014 was the enormous criticism leveled at the Americans for going to war in the first place, and the constant litany cited almost immediately of American abuses involving excessive force. Shooting looters may have restored order, but it also would have now been enshrined as an Abu-Ghraib-like crime \u2014 a photo of a poor \u201chungry\u201d thief broadcast globally as an unarmed victim of American barbarism. We can imagine more \u201cHighway of Death\u201d outrage had we bombed concentrations of Shiites pouring in from Iran or jihadists from Syria going to \u201cweddings\u201d and \u201cfestivals\u201d in Iraq.<\/p>\n Throughout this postmodern war, the military has been on the horns of a dilemma: Don\u2019t shoot and you are indicted for being lax and allowing lawlessness to spread; shoot and you are gratuitously slandered as a sort of rogue LAPD in camouflage. We hear only of the deliberately inexact rubric \u201cIraqi civilian losses\u201d \u2014 without any explanation that almost all the Iraqi dead are either (1) victims of the terrorists, (2) Iraqi security forces trying to defend the innocent against the terrorists, or (3) the terrorists themselves.<\/p>\n Legitimate questions arise as to whether America\u2019 army is too small, or whether requisite political support for military operations is too predicated on the 24-hour news cycle. But all those are issues transcending the war in Iraq. In retrospect, up-armoring humvees would have been wise from the very outset \u2014 so would having something remotely comparable to a Panzerfaust in 1943, more live than dud torpedoes in 1942, or deploying a jet at the beginning of the Korean War that could compete with a Russian Mig 15.<\/p>\n So again, the proper question is\u00a0not<\/i>\u00a0whether there were tragic errors of judgment in Iraq \u2014 but to what degree were they qualitatively different from past errors that are the stuff of war, to what degree were they addressed and corrected, and to what degree did their commission impair the final verdict of the mission?<\/p>\n I<\/span>nstead of this necessary ongoing discussion, we are left with former hawks that clamor ad nauseam for the secretary of Defense\u2019s resignation as a sort of symbolic atonement for their own apparently collective lament that the postwar did not turn out like the aftermaths of Panama, Kosovo, Afghanistan, or Gulf War I. All that angst is about as helpful as perpetually damning Turkey for not letting the 4th ID come down from the north into the Sunni Triangle at the beginning of the war.<\/p>\n It is often said we had no plan to deal with postwar Iraq. Perhaps. But the problem with such a simplistic exegesis is that books and articles now pour forth weekly from disgruntled former constitutional architects and frustrated legal experts who once rushed in to draft Iraqi laws, or angry educationists and bankers whose ideas about school charters or currency regulations were not fully implemented. Somebody apparently had some sort of plan \u2014 or the legions that went into the Green Zone in Spring 2003 wouldn\u2019t have been sent there immediately in the first place.<\/p>\n Yes, we had zillions of plans alright \u2014 but whether they were sufficient to survive the constant and radically changing cycles of war is another matter, especially in a long-failed state plagued with fundamentalism, tribalism, chaos, insurrection, and Sunni, Shiite, and Baathist militias whose leadership had been routed rather than its military crushed. The best postwar plans do not work as they should when losing enemies feel that they won\u2019t be flattened and a successful attacker feels it can\u2019t really flatten them.<\/p>\n In March 2004 perhaps our initial manner of enacting the \u201cplan\u201d \u2014 train the Iraqi security forces, craft a consensual government, and put down the terrorists \u2014 was thwarted by our inexperience and naivet\u00e9. But by March 2006, the identical plan seems to be working far better \u2014 precisely because, as in all wars, we have adapted, modified, and nuanced our way of fighting and nation-building, as American fatalities decrease and Iraqis step up to fight for their freedom.<\/p>\n Nothing in this war is much different from those of the past. We have fought suicide bombers in the Pacific. Intelligence failures doomed tens of thousands \u2014 not 2,300 \u2014 at the Bulge and Okinawa. We pacified the Philippines through counterinsurgency fighting. Failure to calibrate the extent of Al Zarqawi\u2019s insurrection pales before the Chinese crossing of the Yalu.<\/p>\n Even our current clinical depression is typically American. In July 1864, Lincoln was hated and McClellan and the Copperheads who wished a cessation of war and bisection of country canonized. Truman left office with the nation\u2019s anger that he had failed in Korea. As George Bush Sr. departed, the conventional wisdom was that the budding chaos and redrawing of the map of Eastern Europe would prompt decades of instability as former Communists could not simply be spoon fed democracy and capitalism. During Afghanistan by week five we were in a quagmire; the dust storm supposedly threatened our success in Iraq \u2014 in the manner that the explosion of the dome at Samarra marked the beginning of a hopeless civil war that \u201clost\u201d Iraq.<\/p>\n The fact is that we are close to seeing a democratically elected government emerge, backed by an increasingly competent army, pitted against a minority of a minority in Zaraqawi\u2019s Wahhabi jihadists.<\/p>\n While we worry about our own losses, both human and financial, al Qaeda knows that thousands of its terrorists are dead, with its leadership dismantled or in hiding \u2014 and most of the globe turning against it. For all our depression at home, we can still win two wars \u2014 the removal of Saddam Hussein and the destruction of jihadists that followed him \u2014 and leave a legitimate government that is the antithesis of both autocracy and theocracy.<\/p>\n Syria is out of Lebanon \u2014 but only as long as democracy is in Iraq. Libya and Pakistan have come clean about nuclear trafficking \u2014 but only as long as the U.S. is serious about reform in the Middle East.<\/p>\n And the Palestinians are squabbling among themselves, as democracy is proving not so easy to distort after all \u2014 a sort of Western Trojan Horse that they are not so sure they should have brought inside their walls. When has Hamas ever acted as if it has a “sort of” charter to “sort of” destroy Israel? We worry that Iran is undermining Iraq. The mullahs are terrified that the democracy across the border may undermine them \u2014 as if voting and freedom could trump their beheadings and stonings.<\/p>\n Ever since 9\/11 we have been in a long, multifaceted, and much-misunderstood war against jihadists and their autocratic enablers from Manhattan to Kabul, from Baghdad to the Hindu Kush, from London and Madrid to Bali and the Philippines. For now, Iraq has become the nexus of that struggle, in the heart of the ancient caliphate, rather than the front once again in Washington and New York. Whose vision of the future wins depends on who keeps his nerve \u2014 or to paraphrase the Duke of Wellington at Waterloo, \u201cHard pounding, gentlemen; but we will see who can pound the longest.\u201d<\/p>\n \u00a92006 Victor Davis Hanson<\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Who will keep his nerve? by Victor Davis Hanson National Review Online If I could sum up the new orthodoxy about Iraq, it might run something like the following:\u00a0\u201cI supported the overthrow of the odious Saddam Hussein.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_is_tweetstorm":false,"jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":false,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","enabled":false}}},"categories":[776],"tags":[],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p466Sb-13e","jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[{"id":8428,"url":"https:\/\/victorhanson.com\/wordpress\/were-we-right-to-take-out-saddam\/","url_meta":{"origin":4044,"position":0},"title":"Were We Right to Take Out Saddam?","author":"victorhanson","date":"May 20, 2015","format":false,"excerpt":"Public opinion veers with every change in current conditions in Iraq. by Victor Davis Hanson\u00a0\/\/ National Review Online Probable Republican presidential candidate Jeb Bush got himself into trouble by sort of, sort of not, answering the question whether he would have supported going into Iraq in 2003 \u2014 had he\u2026","rel":"","context":"In "Iraq"","block_context":{"text":"Iraq","link":"https:\/\/victorhanson.com\/wordpress\/ahref=\/index.php\/categories\/angry-reader\/categorylink\/a\/the-world\/the-middle-east\/iraq\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"Marine Corps armor in Nasiriyah, March 2003. (Joe Raedle\/Getty)","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/victorhanson.com\/wordpress\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/05\/pic_giant2_051915_SM_Iraq-War-G-500x292.jpg?resize=350%2C200","width":350,"height":200},"classes":[]},{"id":3488,"url":"https:\/\/victorhanson.com\/wordpress\/when-good-news-is-no-news\/","url_meta":{"origin":4044,"position":1},"title":"When Good News Is No News","author":"victorhanson","date":"November 19, 2007","format":false,"excerpt":"by Victor Davis Hanson Tribune Media Services There's an old expression about war: \"Victory has many fathers, while defeat is an orphan.\" But in the case of Iraq, it seems the other way around. We've blamed many for the ordeal of the last four years, but it is the American\u2026","rel":"","context":"In "November 2007"","block_context":{"text":"November 2007","link":"https:\/\/victorhanson.com\/wordpress\/ahref=\/index.php\/categories\/angry-reader\/categorylink\/a\/archives\/2007\/november-2007\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":3673,"url":"https:\/\/victorhanson.com\/wordpress\/memory-and-conflict-in-iraq\/","url_meta":{"origin":4044,"position":2},"title":"Memory and Conflict in Iraq","author":"victorhanson","date":"March 5, 2007","format":false,"excerpt":"by Victor Davis Hanson Tribune Media Services Given all of this country's past wars involving intelligence failures, tactical and strategic blunders, congressional fights and popular anger at the president, Iraq and the rising furor over it are hardly unusual. Imagine if the House of Representatives had debated a resolution to\u2026","rel":"","context":"In "March 2007"","block_context":{"text":"March 2007","link":"https:\/\/victorhanson.com\/wordpress\/ahref=\/index.php\/categories\/angry-reader\/categorylink\/a\/archives\/2007\/march-2007\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":4336,"url":"https:\/\/victorhanson.com\/wordpress\/the-iraqi-wars\/","url_meta":{"origin":4044,"position":3},"title":"The Iraqi Wars","author":"victorhanson","date":"July 12, 2005","format":false,"excerpt":"Our 15-year conflict with Iraq. by Victor Davis Hanson National Review Online Iraq is a blur now. Everyone from Norman Schwarzkopf and General Zinni to Tommy Franks and General Abezaid is mixed up in our memories. The public can't quite separate Baathists from jihadists, Shiite from Sunni, or one coalition\u2026","rel":"","context":"In "July 2005"","block_context":{"text":"July 2005","link":"https:\/\/victorhanson.com\/wordpress\/ahref=\/index.php\/categories\/angry-reader\/categorylink\/a\/archives\/2005\/july-2005\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":3675,"url":"https:\/\/victorhanson.com\/wordpress\/talking-with-rouge-states\/","url_meta":{"origin":4044,"position":4},"title":"Talking with Rouge States","author":"victorhanson","date":"March 4, 2007","format":false,"excerpt":"Why the U.S. should stay away. by Victor Davis Hanson USA Today The following counter-opinion piece appeared in the March 1st issue of\u00a0USA Today. America should attend regional talks that may include Syria and Iran, in support of stabilizing the democracy in Iraq. But the United States should not negotiate\u2026","rel":"","context":"In "March 2007"","block_context":{"text":"March 2007","link":"https:\/\/victorhanson.com\/wordpress\/ahref=\/index.php\/categories\/angry-reader\/categorylink\/a\/archives\/2007\/march-2007\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":2066,"url":"https:\/\/victorhanson.com\/wordpress\/our-flip-flopping-wars\/","url_meta":{"origin":4044,"position":5},"title":"Our Flip-Flopping Wars","author":"victorhanson","date":"December 21, 2009","format":false,"excerpt":"by Victor Davis Hanson Tribune Media Services We don't hear all that much about Iraq these days, do we? The war at one point almost tore apart this country. Public anger sent George W. Bush's approval ratings plummeting. 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